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Only fools think that dead sitting and silent illumination suffice and that 
Zen consists in the source of the mind's being in tranquility.
This typically outspoken statement by Hakuin, intended surely to 
shock his contemporaries, would no doubt surprise a majority of 
readers in the West today, where the SOtd School is still better known 
than the Rinzai tradition. One of the features that distinguishes Rinzai 
from the other schools of Zen is the role it accords to the emotions in 
the task of realizing one’s true nature. If an appropriate comparison 
may help to introduce Rinzai Zen to a wider audience, the figure of 
Nietzsche suggest itself insofar as his views on the emotions are corre­
spondingly distinctive in the Western historical context.1 A further 
reason to compare the stances of these two vis-^-vis the emotions is 
that they have both been subject to misunderstanding. On the one 
hand, there is the stereotypical vision of the Nietzschean Ubermensch 
overflowing with unbridled Dionysiac passion, and on the other the 
serene Zen master, sitting in dispassionate contemplation, unperturbed 
by anything.
1 On a personal note, the idea of comparing Rinzai Zen with Nietzsche came out of 
the experience of spending the best part of a year working on a translation (with 
Setsuko Aihara) of Nihirizumu by Nishitani Keiji {The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism 
[Albany NY 1990)). Professor Nishitani counts Nietzsche as one of his major in­
fluences, along with figures such as Rinzai and Hakuin. The attempt to understand 
how it is that a thinker like Nishitani with such deep roots in his own tradition could 
have been so profoundly influenced by Nietzsche—to this day he speaks of how Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra was “like a Bible” to him—led to a closer look at the ideas of Rin­
zai and Hakuin. It turns out that their ideas on the emotions are an excellent place to 
begin in order to see what is distinctive about the Rinzai tradition.
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Both parties are reacting against the received views of the nature of 
emotion in their respective traditions. The role and function of the emo­
tions and passions in the overall economy of the psyche have generally 
been neglected or denigrated in the Western tradition. The general 
disparagement of the affective side of life with which Nietzsche is faced 
has its roots in the ascetic parts of the teachings of Plato, who is per­
turbed by the way emotion tends to work counter to the proper exercise 
of reason. In his rejection of Platonic/Christian metaphysics, Nietz­
sche gave the emotions and passions an unprecedentedly important 
cognitive and hermeneutic role, seeing them as (in some cases the only) 
ways to certain truths concerning the human condition. Instead of pit­
ting the intellect against the emotions, he encouraged the cultivation of 
a passion for knowledge and understanding (eine Leidenschaft der 
Erkenntnis).2 The exercise of reason is seen as an accommodation 
among a variety of powerful drives and as a function of various motive 
forces (GS 333; also 307). The analysis of reason as a functional rela­
tionship among a plurality of passions led him to speak of the “quan­
tum of reason” that is in every passion (WP 387).
2 The Gay Science, aphorism 374; sec also Beyond Good and Evil, aph. 210. Nietz­
sche’s works will be referred to by way of the following abbreviations, followed by the 
number of the aphorism (preceded, where applicable, by the chapter or section 
number): AC - 77ie Antichrist, BGE - Beyond Good and Evil. GS - The Gay Science, 
HA - Human, All-too human, TI - Twilight of the Idols, WP - The Will to Power, Za - 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
While the East Asian philosophical tradition has not been informed 
by a comparable exaltation of the rational as the paramount principle, 
there is nevertheless in it a strong strain toward detachment from the 
affective sides of psychical life. Zen, however, generally distinguishes 
itself from most Western philosophies in disparaging purely rational or 
calculative thinking as much as it warns against the distracting power 
of the emotions. Part of the revolutionary force of Rinzai Zen in par­
ticular comes from its reaction against the more quietistic tendencies of 
the Ch’an Buddhism that preceded it.
In both Rinzai and Nietzsche is a sense that our ordinary way of be­
ing in the world is permeated by delusion, and that a more fulfilling 
way is possible. Zen speaks of a realization of oneself as the “true 
human of no rank,” and Nietzsche of a transformation that issues in 
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the condition of the Ubermensch. With respect to the emotions, we 
may distinguish three moments in the process, which concern how each 
side views their function in everyday, ego-centered awareness, the role 
of the emotions in attaining liberation, and their place in the constitu­
tion of the Ubermensch or the “true human of the Way.”
I
Nietzsche would concur with many figures in the Buddhist tradition 
concerning the drawbacks of the ego-centered emotions: they tend to 
“blind” us by drastically narrowing our perspectives and obscuring 
our view of things, to carry us away in sometimes dangerous ways, so 
that we risk inflicting damage on ourselves or others—and in general 
they can move us to inappropriate behavior, making us later regret 
what we have said or done. This is perhaps more obviously a position 
held by Buddhism than by Nietzsche, insofar as one of the “Four 
Great Vows” is “to cut off all emotions and passions,” since only by 
eliminating “grasping,” or desire, can the false sense of the substantial 
self be dissolved. It is true that Rinzai too advocates “freeing ourselves 
from the bonds of the emotions,” and that even Hakuin speaks of the 
hindrances to enlightenment in terms of such traditional classifications 
as the “five desires,” the “five coverings,” the “seven misfortunes,” 
the “eight winds” (that fan the passions), and the “ten bonds”—with 
anger, envy, joy, grief, pain and pleasure figuring repeatedly among 
them. But for these thinkers this detachment, or circumvention of hin­
drances, does not—as we shall see—mean the extirpation of emotion.
The affective side of human experience is a topic Nietzsche discusses 
throughout his works, and with ever greater frequency toward the end 
of his career. While he tends to speak more often of the “passions” 
(Leidenschaften) than of the more episodic “affects” (AJfekte), which 
are closer to what we refer to as the “emotions,” the force of his 
discourse about both is that it is impossible to fulfill the task of 
“becoming what one is” if the affects and passions are simply given 
free rein and allowed to dominate the individual's being. For the tradi­
tion prior to Nietzsche, since certain kinds of emotions may be 
beneficial to others even though harmful to the individual moved by 
them, they come to be distinguished as “positive” in contrast with 
other, “negative” emotions. Whereas the ascetic in Plato condemned 
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any situation in which emotions or passions are allowed to tyrannize 
the rational part of the soul, the Christian tradition tended to proscribe 
mainly the negative emotions—and to recommend extirpation as the 
way to deal with them. Nietzsche brands both the Socratic and Chris­
tian prescriptions for human well-being as symptoms of decadence, as 
a desperate response on the part of natures too weak to bring their emo­
tions under control. This position is clearly articulated in a passage 
from Twilight of the Idols'.
There is a stage during which all passions are simply damag­
ing, when they drag their victim down with the sheer weight 
of their stupidity—while at a later, much later stage they are 
wedded with the spirit, and are “spiritualized”. .. To an­
nihilate the passions and desires simply because of their 
stupidity and the unpleasant consequences of yielding to their 
stupidity appears to us now today as itself an acute from of 
stupidity.. .. The Church combats passion with excision in 
every sense: its practice, its “cure” is castration. They never 
ask: “how does one spiritualize, beautify, deify a desire?”.. . 
To attack the passions at their roots means to attack life at its 
roots: the practice of the Church is hostile to life. (TI 5/1).
This might appear to set Nietzsche against the Buddhist as well as the 
Christian position on this issue—especially since in another work from 
the same year he claims that Buddhism and Christianity “belong 
together as nihilistic religions, as decadence religions” (AC 20). He 
goes on, however, to distinguish Buddhism from Christianity as having 
“[put] the self-deception of moral concepts behind it” and thereby 
standing “beyond good and evil.” And indeed this marks an impor­
tant feature that Nietzsche shares with Zen: that they reverse and then 
undercut altogether the distinction between positive and negative emo­
tions.
While some forms of Buddhism may be open to the charge that they 
are life-denying in their stance toward the emotions, Zen is different 
thanks to its origins in the sinification undergone by Buddhism in its 
transplantation to China in the sixth century. There the soil was 
already rich in Taoist ideas, and thinkers like Chuang-tzu exerted a par­
ticular fascination on Rinzai. Of the texts of classical Taoism, the 
Chuang-tzu is richest in emotion—though the emotions celebrated 
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there are perceptive ways of being open to the world rather than coarse­
ly instinctual reactions to it. In the well known story of Chuang-tzu’s 
being discovered after the death of his wife drumming on a pot and 
singing (chap. 18), his explanation is not simply that his detachment 
was such that he was not affected by the bereavement. Rather he 
prefaces the account of his realization that his wife had “gone over to 
be companion with spring and autumn, summer and winter, in the pro­
cession of the four seasons’* by asking his interlocutor: “When she first 
died, do you really suppose that I was not able to feel the loss?” A little 
reflection shows that he was, deeply.
We find an explicit formulation of the Taoist attitude toward the 
emotions in a passage by the famous commentator Wang Pi:
That in which the sage is superior to ordinary people is the 
spirit. But what the sage has in common with ordinary people 
is the emotions. The sage has a superior spirit, and is 
therefore able to be in harmony with the universe ... but he 
has ordinary emotions, and therefore cannot respond to 
things without joy or sorrow. He responds to things, yet is 
not ensnared by them.3
3 San Kuo Chih, ch. 23, Commentary; cited in Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of 
Chinese Philosophy (New York 1948), p. 238.
4 The Record of Lin-chi, trans. Ruth F. Sasaki (Kyoto 1975), p.7 (hereafter ab­
breviated followed by the page number). This is a translation of the Lin-chi lu 
(Japanese, Rinzai-roku) which consists of the recorded sayings of Lin-chi I-hsuan (Rin- 
II
The major focus of the teachings of Rinzai was on the individual 
human being. The expression he uses most often for this is mui no 
shinnin, “the true human of no rank,” a term that comes from the 
Taoist tradition. Rinzai’s way of presenting the central idea of Mahayana 
Buddhism was shocking in its directness: the “true human” is not to 
be sought in the Buddhas and Patriarchs of the tradition, nor in some 
ideal to be attained in the future, but rather in the very persons of the 
individuals listening to his speeches. “Do you want to know the 
Patriarch-Buddha?” he asks, “He is none other than you who stand 
before me listening to my discourse.”4 When Rinzai says of the “true 
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human of the Way” that “merely according with circumstances as they 
are, he makes use of his past karma” (RL 9-10), one can assume that 
such a person “sees through” the emotions in a way that allows things 
to present themselves as they are, while at the same time his “accord­
ing” is informed by appropriate affect. He responds to things (to 
paraphrase Wang Pi) with joy and sorrow, but without ensnarement.
A striking feature of Rinzai Zen is the vehemence with which its 
founder inveighs against what he regards as the stultifying dogmatism 
and rigidity of the conventional Buddhists of his time. His language is 
often reminiscent—in tone as well as content—of Nietzsche’s diatribes 
against “the preachers of slow death” and advocates of “the world 
beyond”:
There are a bunch of blind shave-pates who, having stuffed 
themselves with food, sit down to meditate and practice con­
templation: arresting the flow of thought they don’t let it rise; 
they hate noise and seek stillness. This is the method of the 
heretics. (RL 19)
Hakuin was faced with a corresponding degeneration of the Rinzai 
teachings, and his critique of the “Hinayanists of old” is similarly tren­
chant:
It was only because the direction of their practice was bad, 
because they liked only places of solitude and quiet, knew 
nothing of the dignity of the Bodhisattva. . . that the 
Tathigata compared them to pus-oozing wild foxes and that 
Vimalakirti heaped scorn on them as men who would scorch 
buds and cause seeds to rot.5
zai Gigen, d. 866), the eponymous founder of a school of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism that 
arose in the late T’ang dynasty.
5 The Zen Master Hakuin; Selected Writings, trans. Philip Yampolsky (New York 
1971), p.35 (hereafter abbreviated “ZMH”).
6 ZMH 30-34. The Japanese term here is naikan, which means literally “within-look­
ing”; Hakuin’s play on the words effects a significant shift of the meaning from 
Like Rinzai, Hakuin emphasizes that practice undertaken in peaceful 
seclusion, which he refers to contemptuously as “dead sitting,” is 
useless in comparison with what he calls “practice in the midst of activi­
ty.”6 People who practice in this way are contrasted with “those fools 
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who starve to death on mountains, thinking that dead sitting and silent 
illumination suffice and that Zen consists in the source of the mind be­
ing in tranquility.” Such people, he says, “fail to see into their own 
natures” (ZMH 57).
Rinzai’s tactic of constantly focusing his listeners’ attention on their 
own immediate experience carries the implication that the goal of Zen 
practice is not a condition of apatheia, but rather one as vibrant with 
affective force as our liveliest everyday awareness.
The human being who is right now listening to my discourse .. . 
is without form, without characteristics, without root, 
without source, and without any dwelling place, yet is brisk 
and lively {kappatsu patsuji]. As for all his manifold respon­
sive activities, the place where they are carried on is, in fact, 
no-place. (RL 15)
The term “brisk and lively” (used again at RL 29) comes from Chinese 
Buddhism and connotes the spontaneity of a leaping fish as well as a 
sense of being sharply focused. The “manifold responsive activities” 
of the true human will not exclude the appropriate emotional reac­
tions. That they take place in “no-place,” however, means that the 
emotional responses have ceased—to speak in Nietzschean terms—to 
restrict or tie us down to any particular perspective.
In the context of the traditional Mahayana idea that nirvana is not 
different from samsara, Rinzai goes on to stress that the obstructions 
and ensnarements of the samsaric world can be turned around and uti­
lized for the process of liberation. “Even though you bear the remain­
ing influences of past delusions or the karma from having committed 
the five heinous crimes, these of themselves become the ocean of eman­
cipation.”7 The important doctrinal shift effected by East Asian 
Mahayana Buddhism, to which Rinzai contributed, is especially well 
illustrated by the case of the “Ox-Herding Pictures” by the twelfth­
century Chinese master Kakuan.8 Before Kakuan’s time there were ap-
something like “introspection*’ to “contemplation within [everyday! activity.”
7 RL 12. Discourse 21 ends with the statement: “Virtuous monks, by creating the 
karma of the five heinous crimes, you attain emancipation” (RL 35).
8 The finest version of these pictures with a commentary in a Western language is 
Der Ochs und sein Hirte, elucidated by Master Daizohkutsu R.Ohtsu, trans. KOichi 
Tsujimura and Hartmut Buchner (Pfullingen 1958).
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parently only eight images, the last one being the empty circle represen­
ting the nothingness of mu. Kakuan added the ninth and tenth pictures 
which portray the mountains and rivers and the man’s return to the 
marketplace carrying the wine-bottle, signifying the selfs reintegration 
into the everyday world.
Hakuin expresses the necessity of this reintegration in terms of 
affects: “A person who fanatically avoids the objects of the senses and 
dreads the eight winds that stimulate the passions, unconsciously falls 
into the pit of the Hinayana and never will be able to achieve the Bud­
dha Way.”9 But before delusions and karma can be realized as “the 
ocean of emancipation,” the barriers of the ego-centered self have to 
be broken down; and one of the reasons “the eight winds” are not to 
be shunned or stilled is that energy from the emotions may help to 
effect the breakthrough—and this in two rather different ways.
9 ZMH 35. For one on the way to enlightenment, “the very objects of the senses will 
be Zen meditation, and the five desires themselves will be the One Vehicle [of 
Mahayana]** (ZMH 36).
10 See T.P.Kasulis, Zen Action/Zen Person (Honolulu 1981), ch.8: “Hakuin: The 
Psychodynamics of Zen Training,” which offers an excellent account of the essentials 
of Hakuin’s aims and methods.
Ill
The student of Nietzsche who contemplates what has been aptly 
called the “psychodynamics” of Zen practice according to Hakuin10 
will find strikingly familiar two contrasting yet complementary features 
there, both of which have emotional correlates. The first concerns the 
importance of sickness—suffering, incapacitation, lack of power—as a 
facilitating factor in the process; the other concerns the necessity of 
cultivating what Nietzsche calls “the warrior spirit.”
Of the forces that move our souls, the emotions are among the 
somatically most significant, with the closest ties to the body. They also 
have a special connection with pathology, being capable themselves of 
engendering illness as well as participating in its cure. The similar 
estimations of the importance of sickness on the part of Hakuin and 
Nietzsche may be grounded in a similarity of physical and psychical 
make-up: like Nietzsche’s, Hakuin’s bodily constitution was initially 
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weak, and the intense demands he placed upon it in the relentless pur­
suit of Zen practice resulted in a series of “mental breakdowns” which 
brought him to the verge of complete despair and physical collapse. 
What is important is less the similarity of the somatic disturbances than 
the fact that both Hakuin and Nietzsche came to regard these in­
capacitations as instructive and beneficial for their respective tasks. 
Just as Nietzsche frequently expressed his profound gratitude to the ill­
nesses that plagued him for the insights they afforded into life, so 
Hakuin in his well known “Letter to a Sick Monk” ascribes to his 
teacher Shdju Rdjin the avowal: “This severe illness of mine has been 
an honored good teacher.”H Here is an excerpt from one of Hakuin’s 
own accounts of the sufferings to be undergone on the Zen path:
[On my resolve to] stake my life [on assiduous practice] .. . 
fever rose above my heart, my lungs dried up, both hands and 
feet became cold as though plunged into ice and snow, and 
both ears roared as if I were walking between cataracts in the 
valley. My liver and lungs were completely enervated. Many 
anxieties beset me, my mind was depressed and exhausted. In 
sleeping and waking I saw a thousand phenomena. My arm­
pits broke out in perspiration continuously and my eyes were 
constantly filled with tears.* 12
” ZMH77. See also the section entitled “Zen Sickness** in the chapter on Hakuin in 
Heinrich Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism (New York 1965).
12 Yasen Kanna, cited in Dumoulin, p. 261.
With a change in the opening line to “On my resolve to stake my life on 
writing yet another book,” this account could easily pass for a passage 
in one of Nietzsche’s letters to his friends concerning his physiological 
tribulations. For Nietzsche, such afflictions correspond to the psycholo­
gical effects of abandoning the security of traditional ways of thinking 
and embarking upon the “vast ocean of becoming.” In Zarathustra’s 
words: “Now finally there comes the great terror, the great sickness, 
the great nausea, the great sea-sickness” (Za III. 12 §28).
Similarly, what Hakuin calls “Zen sickness” may be seen as a 
physiological correlate to the “Great Doubt” (daigi) and the “Great 
Death” (daishi), stages that he insists must be undergone on the way
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toward enlightenment. In another letter he offers the following rather 
understated remarks on the process:
When you call forth this great doubt before you in its pure 
and uninvolved form you may undergo an unpleasant and 
strange reaction. However, you must accept the fact that the 
realization of so felicitous a thing as the Great Matter... 
must involve a certain amount of suffering. (ZMH 145)
In order to drive through the Great Doubt to the Great Death and 
beyond, it is necessary to “cut off the root of life.” This may sound 
like a paradigm case of “attacking life at its roots,” but before we 
dismiss it as mere decadence we should listen to Hakuin’s explication 
of his exhortation.
Sometimes it is called illusory thoughts, sometimes the root 
of birth and death, sometimes the passions, sometimes a 
demon. It is one thing with many names, but if you examine it 
closely you will find that what it comes down to is one con­
cept: that the self is real. (ZMH 134)
This passage prompts a brief digression before we look at the “war­
rior” spirit shared by Hakuin and Nietzsche. The diversion will also 
afford an opportunity to turn the tables on Nietzsche in order to put to 
him a Zen-style question.
Interlude
If in invoking the Buddhist exhortation to “cut off the passions” 
Hakuin means vanquishing them and leaving it at that, then the Nietz­
schean charge of decadence would hold. In fact Nietzsche sees this kind 
of move as symptomatic of a particularly dangerous form of degenera­
tion, as is made clear in an early aphorism entitled “Overcoming the 
Passions.”
The human being who has overcome the passions has come 
into possession of the most fruitful soil... To sow the seed 
of good spiritual works on the ground of the subdued pas­
sions is then the urgent next task. The overcoming is only a 
means and not an end; if it is not so viewed, all kinds of weeds 
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and devilish stuff will quickly spring up in this rich soil, and 
soon there will be more rank confusion than there ever was 
before. {HA II/2, 53)
While Hakuin might respond by saying that the springing up of weeds 
is an indication that the ground has not been properly cleared, that one 
has not yet reached the level of complete nothingness (zwu), Rinzai Zen 
could surely endorse a certain kind of re-sowing and applaud the 
growth of radically new life.
Conversely, if Hakuin’s *‘cutting off the root of life” has to do with 
getting rid of the idea of the “I” or ego, then Nietzsche, who sought 
constantly to expose the idea as a mere fiction, would for his part en­
dorse the project. Not only is Hakuin’s emphasis on “nourishing the 
body” and “the art of nurturing life” {ZMH 42-44) compatible with 
Nietzsche’s idea that the true Self behind the ego is precisely the lived 
body {Leib — Za 1.4), but it also deflects the accusation of decadence 
—and especially when we consider how Hakuin understands the pro­
cess of “seeing through” the ego:
If you are not a hero who has truly seen into his own nature, 
don’t think that [non-ego] is something that can be known so 
easily.. . you must be prepared to let go your hold when 
hanging from a sheer precipice, to die and return again to life. 
{ZMH 135)
This talk of “returning to life” evokes a pattern that is prefigured in 
the passage just quoted from Nietzsche on overcoming the passions, 
which itself anticipates some of his later notes on the appropriate 
stance toward the power of the affects.
Overcoming the affects?—No, not if that means their weaken­
ing and annihilation. But to take them into service: which in­
volves tyrannizing them for a long time (not even as an in­
dividual, but as a community, a race, etc.). Eventually one 
gives them back their freedom with confidence: they love us 
like good servants and ultimately go where our best inclines. 
(IFF 384)
Another note from this period speaks in the same vein about “being
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able to take into service the greatest natural powers—the affects” (IFF 
386).
This is the point at which we might ask Nietzsche a question from the 
Zen perspective, and in a typically Zen form that Nietzsche is in fact 
himself fond of employing—namely: “FKJio is it that overcomes the 
passions and does the new planting?” “Who is to tyrannize the affects 
and take them into service?”13
13 This is a crucial question to keep asking in the context of Zen practice, in view of 
the Protean tenaciousness of the ego, which persists in representing itself in various 
guises and disguises.
14 See, for example, GS 333, BGE 36, WP 387.
While it is clear that from the Zen perspective the answer to the 
“who?” question is “the true human without rank” who depends on 
nothing {mu), the response from the Nietzschean side is not immedi­
ately clear. There is, however, a thread running through Nietzsche’s 
writings that leads to the answer—if not to one unequivocal term or 
name. The theme first appears in Dawn of Morning where, in an 
aphorism whose title invokes the themes of self-mastery and modera­
tion, he sketches a picture of the psyche as a field of drives {Triebe) 
striving for power (aph. 109). While we may have the impression, when 
the power of a particular drive is held in check, that it is the intellect 
that has subdued the importunate force, Nietzsche argues that this is an 
illusion, and that what has prevailed is simply “another drive that is a 
rival of the one whose violence has been tormenting us.” (Perhaps 
something like “the drive for peace and quiet” or “fear of shame” has 
prevailed.)
This radical decentering of the psyche is something Nietzsche work­
ed at to the end of his career. He consistently deconstructs the opposi­
tion between reason or intellect and the passions or emotions by under­
standing the former as simply a configuration of the multiplicity of 
drives that constitute the psyche.14 He sometimes calls the “greater 
power” that masters the emotions “the will”; but as long as we bear in 
mind that will is for Nietzsche always essentially multiple, a play of in­
terpretive forces, the resultant picture of the polycentric psyche re­
mains compatible with the Zen idea of non-ego {muga).
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IV
That Nietzsche himself had the strength and courage to break through 
to the stillness behind the drives and emotions to a perspective so 
similar to that of Zen is all the more surprising in view of the major 
difference between their modi operandi. While the practice of Zen in­
volves interaction between master and student or master and master, 
Nietzsche was for most of his life more solitary and detached from 
human intercourse than any Zen master of the order of Rinzai or 
Hakuin. Indeed the Rinzai tradition was bom out of an intensification 
of the relationship between two practitioners, and it was from the 
physical vitality of the engagements between master and pupil that the 
school's “warrior spirit" emerged.15 The major episodes surrounding 
Rinzai’s enlightenment are characterized by frequent and sudden loud 
shouts, as well as by violent exchanges between Rinzai and his teacher 
Obaku and another master, Daigu, involving violent striking and jab­
bing with heavy sticks (RL 50-56).
15 The shouting so typical of Rinzai practice was initiated by Ma-tsu, a master three 
generations back in Rinzai's lineage; but it was with Rinzai that the interactions took 
on a strikingly vital character.
But to return to Hakuin, whom we left hanging on the edge of a 
precipice: he was emphasizing the courage it takes to realize oneself as 
not-self.
Supposing a man should find himself in some desolate area 
where no one has ever walked before. Below him are the 
perpendicular walls of a bottomless chasm. His feet rest 
precariously on a patch of slippery moss, and there is no spot 
of earth on which he can steady himself. He can neither ad­
vance nor retreat; he faces only death. ... His life hangs as if 
from a dangling thread.. .. Then when suddenly you return 
to life, there is the great joy of one who drinks the water and 
knows for himself whether it is hot or cold.. .. This is known 
as seeing into one’s own nature. (ZMH 135)
One is reminded here of the crucial role that courage (Mut)—as well as 
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its concomitant affects of melancholic depression (Schwermut) and ex­
uberance (Obermut)—plays in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in the prot­
agonist’s final engagement with the thought of eternal recurrence.10 *6 It 
is only through courage that Zarathustra is able to overcome his arch­
enemy, the “spirit of gravity,” whose weight would drag him down 
into the depths of the abyss:
10 There is something corresponding to this triad of courage, depression, and ex­
uberance in the emotional swings undergone by Hakuin in the progress of his practice.
At one point he reports on a breakthrough as follows: “I felt that I had achieved the
status [of the former Masters]... My pride soared up like a majestic mountain, my ar­
rogance surged forward like the tide" (ZMH 118). He then presents himself to his
Master to have his "enlightenment" authenticated—upon which the Master laughs,
tweaks his nose, and dismisses him with the exhortation to keep practicing. His subse­
quent practice involves a succession of further breakthroughs, each flanked by ex­
periences of total despair and boundless joy.
17 Zarathustra’s quasi heroic characteristics are complemented throughout by some 
quite anti-heroic traits, including a matrix of feminine images having especially to do 
with pregnancy and labor—which are again related to sickness and suffering.
There is something in me I call courage ... Courage that at­
tacks: for in every attack there is ringing play.... Courage 
even slays dizziness at the edge of abysses: and where would 
human beings not be standing at the edge of abysses! Is seeing 
not it self-seeing abysses? (Za 111.2)
The mood of the warrior (albeit complemented by certain “feminine” 
traits17) was initially encouraged by Zarathustra's realization that 
“[his] enemies too are part of [his] bliss”:
And when I want to mount my wildest steed, it is always my 
spear that helps me up the best... My spear, which I hurl 
against my enemies! How grateful I am to my enemies that I 
may finally hurl it! (Za II. 1)
There is a suggestion that Zarathustra’s enemies extend beyond those 
of his listeners who have distorted his teachings. In Hakuin’s case the 
extension is perhaps even farther-reaching and couched in imagery reso­
nant with Zarathustra’s which serves to banish any misconceptions of 
the mood of Zen practice as apathetic:
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How does one obtain true enlightenment? In the busy round 
of mundane affairs, in the confusion of worldly problems, 
amidst the seven upside-downs and the eight upsets, behave 
as a valiant man would when surrounded by a host of 
enemies. Mount your steed, raise your lance, and, with a 
good showing of your courageous spirit, make up your mind 
to attack, destroy and annihilate the enemy.... At all times 
in your study of Zen, fight against delusions and worldly 
thoughts, battle the black demon of sleep, attack concepts of 
the active and the passive, order and disorder, right and 
wrong, hate and love, and join battle with the things of the 
mundane world. (ZMH 65)
Hardly what one would style a quietistic detachment from the world.
V
What the Zen and Nietzschean perspectives have in common is an ap­
preciation of the vital power of the emotions and a refusal to let that 
power be lost through the reduction or extirpation of affect. There is a 
shared sense that the emotions constitute motive forces that can be 
channeled to effect a breakthrough in our normal ways of being in the 
world. The major difference may lie in Nietzsche’s apparently greater 
concern with the cognitive powers of the emotions, with the emotions 
as movements of the psyche through which one comes to know things. 
More so than the Zen thinkers, he sees the emotions as ways of 
penetrating matters and opening them up, as arrows that pierce to 
the hearts of things and thereby bring our hearts closer to them. The 
opposition between this “Dionysiac” method, which takes joy in merg­
ing and abolishing boundaries, and the cool detachment of Apollo 
that characterizes the mainstream tradition of Western epistemology 
runs through Nietzsche’s major works.18 A later formulation of the 
idea can be found in On the Genealogy of Morals, where he writes of 
preparing the intellect for a future “objectivity” that will consist in “the 
” A classic presentation of this opposition, couched in vivid procreative imagery, is 
to be found in the chapter "On Immaculate Perception” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
(11.15).
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ability ... to employ the very variety of perspectives and affect-inter­
pretations in the service of knowledge.”:
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “know­
ing”; and the more affects we can let speak about a thing, the 
more eyes, different eyes, we can use to look at a thing, the 
more complete our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivi­
ty,” will be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend 
each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this: 
would this not mean to castrate the intellect?19
19 GM III.2; see also BGE 211, where Nietzsche writes of the desirability of being 
able to “see with many kinds of eyes and consciences.”
With their relative indifference to epistemological issues, the major 
figures of the Rinzai tradition have less concern with “objectivity” 
as such; and while, on the other hand, they have no interest in 
“suspending] each and every affect,” their aim is to open up a space 
for free play with the emotions rather than to pursue the Dionysian 
compounding of affect advocated by Nietzsche. The koan practice of 
the Rinzai school serves to constellate psychic energy and intensify its 
affective components, in such a way as to effect a kind of “short-cir­
cuit” of conceptual thinking. And yet, remarkably, this sort-circuiting 
results in neither the castration of the intellect nor the annihilation of 
emotion that Nietzsche sees as the death of the spirit and soul.
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